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Abstract 
 
Although rice has been a prominent cash crop in areas with access to lowland in Uganda, 
the adoption of rice and area expansion have stagnated despite the Government of 
Uganda’s 2009 National Rice Development Policy and its commitment to doubling rice 
production over 10 years. Using panel data collected in 2010 and 2017 as well as risk 
preference data elicited via lab-in-the-field experiments conducted in rural Uganda, we 
find that farmers with higher loss aversion are less likely to grow rice and expand their 
rice cultivation areas. This study affirms that risk preferences play a critical role in 
agricultural production decisions. 
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1. Introduction 
Many studies have examined why apparently profitable technology is not 
adopted. While theoretical studies have attributed low technology adoption in 
developing countries to many factors, high risk-aversion is one of them [1,2]. Several 
empirical studies test their theoretical predictions using household assets and 
educational attainment as proxies for risk aversion since they are key determinants of it 
[3,4]. Other studies have adopted survey-based methods whereby hypothetical choice 
questions with different degrees of risk are used to measure risk aversion [5]. Since the 
survey-based method is not incentive-compatible, self-reported personal attitudes and 
traits may not capture actual risk preference levels [6]. Thus, studies have attempted to 
measure risk aversion using experimental methods [7].  
Several experimental methods have been developed to observe choices that 
reflect each individual’s risk preference [8]. Experiments in which many of the 
experimental factors are controlled by the experimenter can ensure that the elicited risk 
measure is influenced only by risk preferences. The experimental evidence on risk 
preferences is growing, but studies that examine whether risk attitudes affect 
agricultural technology adoption decisions using elicited risk preferences are scant.   
This study examines whether risk preferences affect rice adoption in Uganda 
using panel data collected in 2010 and 2017 as well as risk preferences elicited from 
lab-in-the-field experiments. Although rice has been a prominent cash crop in areas with 
access to lowland in Uganda [9], rice adoption and area expansion have stagnated. This 
is disappointing given that the Government of Uganda (GoU) released the National Rice 
Development Policy (NRDP) in 2009 and made a commitment to doubling rice 
production over 10 years. Many farmers hire labor for rice production, unlike for other 
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major staple crops such as maize and cassava, since it needs to be transplanted and 
harvested within a few days. As indicated in Fig. 1, the likelihood of earning negative 
income in normal year is much higher for rice than for maize. The standard deviation of 
the income per hectare from rice is much larger than that from maize.  The stagnant 
diffusion of rice in terms of the number of rice growers and the area under rice 
cultivation can be explained with reference to farmers’ risk preferences, especially their 
loss aversion. Thus, this study tests the hypothesis that farmers’ loss aversion plays an 
important role in the adoption of rice cultivation.  
 
Fig 1. Rice and Maize Income 
Household-level rice and maize income in 2009/10 calculated by deducting paid-out 
costs from revenue (total production multiplied by median price at each village). 
Income measured at 2010 price level, and density estimated by using kdensity command 
in Stata software. 
Studies that elicit risk preferences through experiments find that higher risk 
aversion is associated with a lower adoption of new technologies with higher subjective 
risk such as Bt cotton in China [10] and chemical fertilizer in Uganda [11]. However, 
these studies use cross-sectional estimation method and do not control for household 
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unobserved heterogeneity such as farming ability and soil fertility, which can result in 
biased estimates. To our knowledge, ours is the first study to use panel estimation 
methods to analyze the role of risk preferences in agricultural technology adoption 
combined with elicited risk and loss aversion from a lab-in-the-field experiment. By 
applying a correlated random effect framework, we find that those who are more loss 
averse are less likely to adopt rice or to expand their cultivation area. Although our main 
variable of interest is rice adoption which is not technology adoption but crop choice, 
we also examine technology adoption such as better farming practices and chemical 
fertilizer for growing rice. We find no evidence that risk preferences decrease adoption 
rates of better farming practices and chemical fertilizer once we limit the sample to rice 
growers.     
This study also examines whether risk preferences affect households’ 
diversification strategies for both rice cultivation and that of other crops. Households 
attempt to reduce risk by diversifying their income sources [12] as well as by allocating 
land to different crops [13] and labor to non-agricultural activities [14-16]. The amount 
of land to allocate to drought-tolerant crops is determined according to the household’s 
risk preferences. Accordingly, we find that more risk-averse households tend to allocate 
more land to leguminous crops. Regarding the diversification of income sources, we 
find no significant evidence that households displaying higher risk and loss aversion 
tend to diversify income to off-farm activities other than crop production.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the study’s 
data, experimental design, and econometric framework. Section 3 provides the 
experimental results and estimation results. The final section presents conclusions.  
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2. Methods 
2.1 Data 
In Uganda, rice is a staple food, though it is a relatively minor source of calorie 
consumption [17]. Rapid population growth and urbanization have been increasing rice 
consumption levels, resulting in the annual importation of 60,000 metric ton of rice [18]. 
Since increasing rice production can be used to save foreign reserves by reducing the 
amount of imported rice as well as to improve food security and reduce rural poverty, 
the GoU formulated the NRDP in 2009 and committed to doubling rice production over 
10 years by joining the Coalition for African Rice Development (CARD[19]).  
Household surveys were conducted in 2010 and 2017 to monitor the progress 
of rice production in Uganda amid its rainfed lowland ecosystem by constructing panel 
data in major lowland rice production areas. Structured questionnaire and procedures 
and scripts for field experiments were reviewed and approved by the research ethics 
committee at the JICA Research Institute. The sample districts were purposively 
selected based on the availability of the wetland usable for rice production in eastern 
and northern Uganda. The average rice cultivation experience and agro-ecological 
conditions were also used as criteria for selecting the sample districts, employed to 
capture a wide variety of rainfed lowlands and various levels of rice cultivation skill. 
Five districts out of 28 eastern and two northern districts were chosen (see Fig. 2). The 
geographic coordinates for these districts are (00°56N, 33°57E), (01°30N, 33°57E) 
(01°55N, 33°06E), (02°20N, 33°06E), and (01°55N, 33°10E). Butaleja and Lira 
districts have large-scale irrigation schemes, and farmers in these districts have 
longer-term rice production experience than farmers in the other districts. Households in 
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Lira and Dokolo districts also have larger landholdings, on average, than households in 
other districts.  
 
Fig 2: Sample Communities 
Black dots are locations of sample communities within the international boundary of 
Uganda. 
Source: Authors created this figure by using Arc GIS 
 
We collected the information about main rice producing area from the District 
Agricultural Officer in each district. Two sub-counties locally well-known as rice 
producing areas were selected from each district. In the 10 selected sub-counties, the 
names of all Local Council 1s (LC1s, the lowest administrative unit in Uganda, 
consisting of three to five villages) in each sub-county were listed. From the list, 60 
LC1s were randomly selected. In each LC1, 10 households were randomly selected 
using the household lists obtained from the LC1chairpersons. A total of 600 households 
were interviewed in January-February 2010.  Before interviewing, enumerators asked 
sampled households if they agreed to be interviewed verbally and a few refused to be 
interviewed. In the follow-up survey conducted in February 2017, 61 households were 
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not available for interview, mostly because they had moved far away or to unknown 
places. The panel data comprise 539 households. Since the attrition rate is about 10%, 
attrition weight will be used for all the analyses to address possible biases due to 
non-random attrition. A community-level survey was also conducted in each LC1.   
The household questionnaire posed a wide range of questions to capture data on 
all of the farm and non-farm activities engaged in over the previous 12 months, as well 
as on household demography, consumption expenditures, and asset ownership (e.g., 
land, livestock, farm equipment, other household items). For farm activities, During the 
2017 survey, all the sample households were invited after the interview to participate in 
incentivized lab-in-the-field experiments. We invited one person from each household 
who was either the household head or main decision-maker concerning crop production. 
When the household head was too old to understand the experimental design or engaged 
mainly in non-farm work, the survey team invited the non-household head who made 
the major decisions about farm work. 
 
2.2 Experimental design 
In the experiments, participants chose from a price list. Risk preference 
elicitations were administered in a group setting in which the experimenter read 
instructions in front of the entire group. Each group had 10 subjects. Choices were made 
individually and privately. The subjects were paid at the end of the experiment, which 
provided no incentive to answer dishonestly [20]. Our multiple price list experiment 
was developed based on that in [8], which is relatively simple and easy to understand 
even by uneducated farmers in developing countries [21]. The participants chose one 
item from paired lottery options. As shown in S1 File, they were asked to pick either 
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option A (safe option) or option B (risky option). The experiment was kept as simple as 
possible to prevent confusion over the concept of probability. This list had been tested 
before in Uganda [22] and was also pretested before this survey. 
 
Table 1. Payoff Matrix for the Risk Preference Experiments 
Panel A. Experiment 1 (Gains) 
 
Row 
Column A Column B EVA 
-EVB 
CRRA interval 
if switches to B 
under EUT 
Mid 
Point 
Number 
of 
subjects 
p M p MH 1-p ML 
1-1 1 4000 0.25 4000 0.75 2000 1500 n/a n/a - 
1-2 1 4000 0.25 7000 0.75 2000 750 -∞ < σ ≤ -1.15 -1.15 43 
1-3 1 4000 0.25 10000 0.75 2000 0 -1.15 < σ ≤ 0.00 -0.58 72 
1-4 1 4000 0.25 13000 0.75 2000 -750 0.00 < σ ≤ 0.41 0.21 37 
1-5 1 4000 0.25 16000 0.75 2000 -1500 0.41 < σ ≤ 0.62 0.52 42 
1-6 1 4000 0.25 16000 0.75 2000 -2250 0.62 < σ ≤ 1.60 1.11 88 
1-7 1 4000 0.25 16000 0.75 2000 -2625 1.60 < σ ≤ 3.04 2.32 71 
1-8 1 4000 0.25 16000 0.75 2000 -3000 3.04 < σ ≤ ∞ 3.04 168  
Panel B: Experiment 2 (Losses)  
Row Column A Column B EVA 
-EVB
Number 
of 
subjects
p MH 1-p ML p MH 1-p ML 
1-1 0.5 6000 0.5 -500 0.5 6000 0.5 -4000 1750 - 
1-2 0.5 4000 0.5 -500 0.5 6000 0.5 -4000 750 4 
1-3 0.5 1000 0.5 -500 0.5 6000 0.5 -4000 -750 89 
1-4 0.5 500 0.5 -500 0.5 6000 0.5 -4000 -1000 51 
1-5 0.5 500 0.5 -500 0.5 6000 0.5 -3000 -1500 63 
1-6 0.5 500 0.5 -1000 0.5 6000 0.5 -3000 -1750 41 
1-7 0.5 500 0.5 -1000 0.5 6000 0.5 -2000 -2250 83 
1-8 0.5 500 0.5 -1000 0.5 6000 0.5 -1000 -2750 172 
Notes: Panel shows all the payoffs (M) and the attached probabilities (p, 1-p) for choices A and B in 
the risk preference experiment 1 (Panel A) and experiment 2 (Panel B). EVA - EVB is the difference 
in the expected value between lottery A and lottery B. The range of sigma σ is calculated by equating 
the expected utilities from lottery A and lottery B assuming constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) 
utility function. 
 
Two risk preference experiments were conducted: one involving payoff gains 
and the other involving both payoff gains and losses. One advantage of the experiments 
is that they were incentivized and involved real losses, just like real-life investments. 
The experimental procedure used in this study is comparable to previous experiments 
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on risk-elicitation tasks. Table 1 indicates the different payoff options in the risk 
preference experiments. Each experiment comprised eight rows. The first question was 
a test designed to judge whether the respondent understood the instructions [23]. In 
Experiment1, the payoff associated with option A remained unchanged, while the payoff 
for option B increased. In Experiment 2, the payoff associated with option A declined 
systematically throughout the tasks, while the payoff for option B remained unchanged 
or increased. By assuming constant relative risk aversion, the respondents’ risk aversion 
is then directly related to the line at which they switched from preferring option A to 
preferring option B. The expected values of the two options were not shown to the 
respondents during the experiments.  
A risk-seeking participant would choose the lottery in the second task, while 
the most risk-averse subject would choose option A in the eighth task. Because a 
risk-neutral participant should theoretically switch from option A to option B when the 
expected value of both is approximately equal, the participant would select option A for 
the third task. The respondents’ loss aversion is elicited from Experiment 2, and the risk 
aversion coefficient is elicited from Experiment 1. A detailed explanation is provided 
inS1 File. We do not examine ambiguity aversion, unlike the previous study [24], who 
found that ambiguity aversion is more important than risk aversion for the early 
adoption of genetically modified corn in the US, which decreases the ambiguity of pest 
damage. Since our sample households reside in communities characterized by rice 
cultivation, the risk of growing rice and its distribution are known factors, which makes 
ambiguity aversion is less relevant than risk aversion.  
 
2.3 Empirical model 
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To assess whether risk preferences affect farmers’ crop choices, we estimate the 
following model: 
𝑦௜௝௧ ൌ 𝛽𝑋௜௝ ൅ 𝛾𝑍௜௝௧ ൅ 𝜇௜ ൅ 𝑒௜௝௧ 
where yijt is the crop choice of household i in village j at time t. Xij is a set of the 
respondents’ elicited risk preferences (risk and loss aversion), Zijt is a set of household 
characteristics, μi is household-level unobserved heterogeneity other than risk 
preferences, and eijt is an error term. β and γ are the parameters to be estimated. The 
main coefficient of interest is β. We use three measures for crop choice: a dummy 
variable reflecting whether the household has cultivated rice in the last 12 months, the 
area under rice cultivation, and the share of land under rice cultivation. We use both risk 
and loss aversion coefficients as the main explanatory variable, similar to the previous 
studies [10, 25]. The results remain qualitatively the same when we use the risk 
preference measures one at one time as alternative specifications, as shown in S6 Table. 
Since not all the households cultivated rice, our outcome variables are likely to 
be nonlinear. For the estimates to be consistent in nonlinear panel models, the 
assumption of independence between the covariates and μi needs to be held when using 
fixed effect models. However, the assumption is often too strong to be held. 
Alternatively, a correlated random effects framework does not require this assumption 
and can control for time-constant unobserved heterogeneity (as can the fixed effects 
model) without having incidental parameters in nonlinear models [26]. Since the main 
explanatory variables—the risk preference measures—are time-invariant, a correlated 
random effects framework that can estimate the time-constant independent variables is 
preferable to a household fixed effect model. 
Even after time-constant unobserved heterogeneity μi is controlled for by 
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adopting a correlated random effects framework, one may argue that risk preference Xij 
is correlated with time-varying unobservable eijt. As shown in S2 Table, risk preferences 
were not affected by recent shocks. It is thus safe to assume independence between risk 
preference Xij and time-varying unobservable eijt after controlling for μi.  
Rice has been a cash crop in our sample areas for more than 30 years. For some 
households, not growing rice (i.e., having an area under rice cultivation of zero) can be 
optimal. As functional forms, we adopt a probit model to determine whether to cultivate 
rice and a Tobit model for the area under rice cultivation and the share of area under rice 
cultivation out of the total cultivated area.   
Since 10% of the sample households could not be resurveyed in 2017, we 
adopt the attrition correction procedure suggested by [27] and use attrition weights in all 
analyses. We first estimate a probit model to explain whether a household remains in the 
follow-up survey and obtain the predicted probability that a household remains in the 
panel data. The attrition weights are calculated as the inverse of the predicted 
probabilities in order to give greater weight to households with a lower probability of 
remaining in the sample but who were in fact re-surveyed. The results of the probit 
model are shown in S1 Table.  
 To analyze crop production diversification, we consider the area that 
households have used for maize, root, and leguminous crop cultivation in the previous 
12 months. Since root crops such as cassava are less prone to drought, households with 
higher risk aversion may plant cassava in a large area.  
 
3. Results 
3.1 Experimental results 
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The last column of Table 1 and Fig 3 show the distribution of the rows in which 
subjects switched from option A to B. We see that a significant number of subjects (168) 
are extremely risk averse. Those who switched in either row 7 or 8 account for 46% of 
the total. Such extreme choices are also found in Experiment 2, where 51% switched 
from A to B in either row 7 or 8. This suggests that the participants chose slightly safer 
options when the game involved losses.    
In Experiment 1, 18 participants chose all A or all B, which are not rational 
choices. In Experiment 2, an additional 18 participants selected irrational choices. Since 
they might not have understood the risk experiment fully, we do not use these cases in 
our analyses. Thus, the total number of households used in the analyses of risk and loss 
aversion became 521 and 503, respectively. 
 
Table 2. Risk and Loss Aversion  
Combined 
Mean 
HH who have 
grown rice   
HH who 
have never 
grown rice   
 
t-stats 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Risk aversion 1.366 1.388 1.186 -0.958 
 (1.497) (1.497) (1.496)  
Loss aversion 2.259 2.208 2.657 2.082 
 (1.538) (1.532) (1.536)  
Number of observations 521 475 46  
Subject’s characteristics 46.354 46.877 46.293 0.287 
Age (14.511) (15.254) (14.436)  
Schooling 5.876 5.789 5.886 -0.193 
(3.555) (4.118) (3.488)  
Gender (Male=1) 0.657 0.667 0.657 0.166 
(0.475) (0.476) (0.476)  
Head 0.688 0.684 0.689 -0.071 
 (0.464) (0.469) (0.463)  
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. The last column shows the t-statistics to 
test if means of column (2) and (3) are same or not. 
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Table 2 summarizes the estimated risk aversion and loss aversion parameters as 
well as the participants’ basic characteristics. About 70% of the participants were 
household heads, 66% were male, and they had completed 5.9 years of schooling. There 
were no differences in age or education levels between those who had grown rice and 
those who had never done so.  
The overall mean risk aversion (1.37) is comparable to the estimate of 1.32 for 
rural Uganda [28]. The mean loss aversion parameter (2.26) is lower than the estimates 
for rural Uganda (3.22) [22]. The notion of loss aversion is that the disutility of losses 
weighs more heavily than does the utility of comparable gains [29, 30]. The results 
suggest that, on average, the reduction in utility due to losing 1 USD has a magnitude 
equal to an increase in utility due to gaining 2.26 USD. As shown in columns 2 and 3, 
no differences in risk aversion are observed between rice growing households and 
non-growing households, while rice growers tend to be less loss averse than 
non-growers.   
Following [8], we examine the correlates of risk preferences via ordinary least 
square (OLS). S2 Table presents the estimated results. None of the individual or 
household characteristics except marital status is significantly associated with risk 
preferences. Those who are married are more likely to be less loss averse. Furthermore, 
shocks exposed in the last 12 months are not correlated with risk preferences, 
suggesting that risk preferences are stable to exogenous shocks [31].  
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for participant, household, and 
community characteristics. About 10% of the sample households have never grown rice. 
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Households who have grown rice have more members than those who have never done 
so.  
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
Combined 
Mean 
HH who never 
grown rice   
HH who have 
grown rice   
 
t-stats 
Head’s age 51.087 51.667 51.019 0.341 
 (13.559) (14.361) (13.476)  
Head Schooling 5.757 5.561 5.780 -0.433
 (3.601) (4.148) (3.534)  
Female Headed HH 0.096 0.158 0.089 1.662 
 (0.296) (0.368) (0.285)  
Household Size 7.289 6.368 7.398 -2.579
(2.866) (2.717) (2.866)  
Share of male adults (15-69) 0.277 0.285 0.276 0.388 
 (0.159) (0.212) (0.162)  
Share of female adults (15-69) 0.255 0.298 0.249 2.424 
 (0.143) (0.174) (0.138)  
Own Land Size (Acre) 5.395 5.171 5.422 -0.328
(5.455) (3.948) (5.609)  
Assets Value  6.629 8.741 6.432 1.331 
(100,000 Uganda Shillings) (11.261) (16.897) (10.588)  
Received non-labor income 0.866 0.842 0.869 -0.569
 (0.341) (0.368) (0.337)  
Has HH member engaged in  0.733 0.719 0.734 -0.244
off-farm employment (0.443) (0.453) (0.442)  
Member of HH has phone 0.412 0.263 0.429 -2.421
 (0.493) (0.444) (0.496)  
Saving group member 0.518 0.544 0.515 0.418 
(ROSCA or VSLA) (0.500) (0.503) (0.500)  
Agricultural Training (last 5yrs)  0.430 0.281 0.448 -2.423
 (0.496) (0.453) (0.498)  
Farmer group member 0.234 0.298 0.226 1.216 
 (0.424) (0.462) (0.419)  
Distance from home  21.038 23.632 20.731 2.127 
to district town (km) (9.769) (11.023) (9.576)  
Shocks experienced (last 12 months) 0.503 0.474 0.506 -0.464
Drought (0.500) (0.504) (0.500)  
Shocks experienced (last 12 months) 0.029 0.000 0.033 -1.396
  Floods (0.169) (0.000) (0.179)  
Note: In parenthesis are standard deviations. t-statistics for testing means between those who have 
grown rice by January 2017 and those who have never grown rice.      
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There are no differences in education level, assets, land holdings, access to 
off-farm employment and non-labor income, or access to credit (measured by bank 
account holder and saving group member) between rice growers and non-growers. 
However, rice growers are better equipped in terms of access to agricultural training, 
phone ownership, and access to district towns. The bottom rows of Table 3 show 
whether the households experienced shocks such as drought, floods, land conflict, and 
sickness in the last 12 months. Half of the households experienced drought in the last 12 
months. There are no differences in the share of households who were recently exposed 
to shocks between rice growers and non-rice growers. In the sample areas, certified 
lowland rice variety seeds are not sold by agro-dealers. Most of the farmers keep their 
own seeds out of their harvests or purchase them from fellow farmers. Although we 
asked the farmers what variety they cultivated in the survey, many were not sure. 
Table 4 shows the rice cultivation results for 2009 and 2016. Although nearly 
90% of the sample households have grown rice, as shown in Table 3, the proportion of 
households who cultivated rice in the previous 12 months decreased from 67% in 2009 
to 58% in 2016. The area under rice cultivation and the share of the area under rice 
cultivation have not increased. Among rice growers, around 1 acre of land is allocated to 
rice, which accounts for 18% to 20% of the cultivated land (see Panel B). In the sample 
area, there is no evidence that the number of rice growing households or the area under 
rice cultivation expanded from 2009 to 2016.   
As a measure of better cultivation practices (see Panel B of Table 4), we use two 
measures to reflect whether households constructed bunds for better water control and 
transplanted in rows for proper plant density and easier weed management. More than 
half of the households have adopted a transplanting method, but less than 10% 
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transplant in rows. About 40% of them use the broadcasting method, which can save 
time and labor but makes it difficult to control weeds without using herbicide. Rice 
productivity is measured in terms of rice production per hectare (yield) and rice income 
(revenue minus paid-out costs) per hectare. In 2016, many households could not harvest 
rice due to severe drought, lowering the average yield and income in 2016 relative to the 
2009 figures. 
 
Table 4. Rice Cultivation and Input Use in 2009 and 2016 
 2009  2016  
Panel A. All households (No. HH= 503)     
Households who grew rice in the last 12 months 0.672 (0.470) 0.584 (0.493) 
Area under rice (ha) 0.400 (0.597) 0.381 (0.545) 
Share of area under rice 0.164 (0.177) 0.175 (0.209) 
Share of land allocated to maize 0.231 (0.193) 0.239  (0.256) 
Share of land allocated to roots crops 0.181 (0.165) 0.194  (0.231) 
Share of land allocated to legumes 0.139 (0.128) 0.145  (0.195) 
Area under maize (ha) 0.435 (0.621) 0.465 (0.635) 
Area under legume crops (ha) 0.333 (0.505) 0.295 (0.510) 
Area under roots crops (ha) 0.474 (0.634) 0.326 (0.442) 
Labor hired in the last 12 months (any crop) 0.636 (0.481) 0.496 (0.500) 
Labor hired for upland crop in the last 12 months 0.353 (0.478) 0.498 (0.500) 
Chemical fertilizer applied (any crop) 0.030 (0.170) 0.169 (0.375) 
Share of income from crop production and farm labor 0.706 (0.260) 0.625 (0.291) 
Share of income from livestock activities 0.155 (0.276) 0.148 (0.187) 
Share of income from non-farm sector 0.119 (0.244) 0.228 (0.299) 
Share of non-labor income 0.020 (0.142) 0.000 (0.001) 
Panel B: Rice growers only (No. HH= 388)     
Households who grew rice in the last 12 months 0.737 (0.441) 0.654 (0.476) 
Area under rice (ha) 0.442 (0.616) 0.426 (0.560) 
Share of area under rice 0.180 (0.179) 0.196 (0.212) 
Adoption of cultivation practices     
Constructing bunds 0.536 (0.499) 0.546 (0.499) 
Broadcasting 0.434 (0.496) 0.435 (0.497) 
Transplanting in row 0.050 (0.218) 0.089 (0.285) 
Rice yield (ton/ha) 2.112 (1.328) 1.494 (1.439) 
Rice income (mill. shilling/ha) 1.694 (1.591) 1.576 (1.993) 
Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
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As shown in Panel A of Table 4, households allocate more land to maize than to 
rice. Roots crops such as cassava and sweet potato and leguminous crops such as 
common beans and ground nuts are also commonly grown in the sample communities. 
Around 70% of household income was generated from crop production and wage 
earning from farm labor in 2009. In 2016, when severe drought affected many 
households, the share of crop income declined, and the share of non-farm income 
increased.  
 
3.3 Estimation results 
Table 5 shows the estimation results regarding rice cultivation decisions 
generated by estimating correlated random effects model. In columns (1) and (2), the 
dependent variable is a dummy variable reflecting whether the households cultivated 
rice over the previous 12 months. The dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is the 
share of the area under rice cultivation, while that in columns (5) and (6) is the area 
under rice cultivation in hectares, respectively. We show two specifications for each 
dependent variable. In the second specification (columns 2, 4, and 6), access to 
agricultural information (farmer group membership) and access to credit (ROSCA or 
VSLA) are added as explanatory variables.  
In both specifications, we find that higher loss aversion decreases the 
probability of rice cultivation. By contrast, there is no evidence that risk aversion 
influences the decision on whether to grow rice. The results estimated separately in 
2009 and 2016 show similar results (see S3 Table). As an alternative specification, we 
run a conditional probit model to test whether risk preferences affect the rice-cultivation 
decision differently for rice growers and non-growers.  Specifically, we test whether  
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Table 5. Rice Cultivation (Correlated Random effect) 
 Rice grown in last 12 
months 
Probit model (dy/dx) 
Share of area under rice in 
last 12 months 
Tobit model (dy/dx) 
Area under rice (ha)  
in last 12 months 
Tobit model (dy/dx) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Risk aversion -0.0323 -0.0282 -0.0112 -0.0110 -0.0327* -0.0306* 
 (0.0416) (0.0417) (0.00860) (0.00856) (0.0181) (0.0180) 
Loss aversion -0.124*** -0.119*** -0.0271*** -0.0270*** -0.0760*** -0.0746***
 (0.0392) (0.0392) (0.00833) (0.00830) (0.0176) (0.0175) 
Head Age -0.016*** -0.0164*** -0.0026*** -0.0027*** -0.0064*** -0.0066***
 (0.00445) (0.00445) (0.00096) (0.000953) (0.00204) (0.00203)
Head Schooling -0.0219 -0.0250 -0.00721* -0.0075** -0.00514 -0.00695 
 (0.0179) (0.0180) (0.00373) (0.00374) (0.00784) (0.00785)
Female Head 0.173 0.157 0.0573 0.0565 -0.0264 -0.0310 
 (0.342) (0.341) (0.0742) (0.0739) (0.155) (0.154) 
Household Size 0.0313 0.0265 -0.0001 0.00085 0.0312*** 0.0318***
 (0.0281) (0.0285) (0.00553) (0.00558) (0.0115) (0.0116) 
Share of males (15-69) 0.450 0.449 0.0387 0.0343 0.134 0.105 
 (0.493) (0.493) (0.101) (0.101) (0.213) (0.212) 
Share of females  0.0160 -0.0532 -0.210* -0.199 -0.141 -0.128 
 (15-69) (0.586) (0.591) (0.125) (0.126) (0.262) (0.262) 
log(Landholding in ha 0.110* 0.111* -0.0199* -0.0193* 0.0672*** 0.0689***
+0.01) (0.0596) (0.0597) (0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0240) (0.0239) 
Value of assets (log) 0.0904 0.0950 0.0111 0.0105 0.0439 0.0433 
 (0.0599) (0.0602) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0273) (0.0272) 
Non labor income -0.0351 -0.0691 -0.0193 -0.0120 -0.0478 -0.0357 
 (0.156) (0.160) (0.0329) (0.0333) (0.0679) (0.0685) 
Off farm employment -0.0651 -0.0699 0.0149 0.0170 0.0324 0.0341 
 (0.166) (0.166) (0.0343) (0.0342) (0.0708) (0.0705) 
No mobile phone 0.0975 0.0920 -0.0146 -0.0128 0.0301 0.0341 
 (0.166) (0.166) (0.0344) (0.0343) (0.0711) (0.0708) 
Farmer group member  0.0854  -0.0481  -0.145** 
  (0.179)  (0.0361)  (0.0735) 
Saving group member  0.182  -0.0194  0.0380 
(ROSCA or VSLA)  (0.178)  (0.0364)  (0.0747) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LC1 fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006 1006 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. Numbers shown are marginal effects. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. Means of all time varying factors (except risk 
and loss aversion) are controlled for. Attrition weights are used. 
 
higher loss aversion decreases the likelihood of rice cultivation in 2016 given the 
adoption of rice in 2009. Similarly, we examine whether lower loss aversion increases 
the likelihood of rice cultivation in 2016 given the non-cultivation of rice in 2009.  
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S4 Table shows that among rice growing households in 2009, the higher loss 
aversion increases the probability of disadopting rice cultivation (see columns 1 and 2) 
while there is no evidence that among non-rice growing households in 2009, lower loss 
aversion increases the adoption rate of rice (see columns 3 and 4). These results suggest 
that risk preferences affect the adoption of rice differently between rice growers and 
non-growers.   
We also look at the differential impact of risk and loss aversion on adopting 
rice by household’s wealth status.  As shown in S2 Table, the wealth measured by the 
value of assets is negatively correlated with risk and loss aversion though the 
coefficients are not statistically significant. It may be the case that risk preferences 
affect household’s decision on rice cultivation differently by wealth status since poorer 
households tend to be more vulnerable to negative shocks [12].  Sample households 
are divided into two based on the value of assets. Average risk and loss aversion 
coefficients for poorer and richer households are not statistically different. We estimate 
same model separately for poorer households with asset values lower than the median 
and richer households with asset values higher than the median. As shown in S5 Table, 
the higher loss aversion decreases the probability of growing rice among the poorer 
households. Among richer households, however, we do not find such negative effect of 
loss aversion on rice cultivation decision. Thus, this finding suggests that households 
are less likely to grow rice if households with higher loss aversion face credit 
constraints.   
The estimated results on the share of the area under rice cultivation out of the 
total cultivation area are presented in columns (3) and (4) of Table 5. We find that 
higher loss aversion decreases the share of the area under rice cultivation. As shown in 
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the last 2 columns, higher loss aversion decreases the size of the land allocated to rice. 
Unlike in the results on the share of the area under rice cultivation, household size and 
landholding can be constraining factors on the expansion of the rice cultivation area.  
Even when we control for risk aversion and loss aversion one at a time (S5 
Table), loss aversion significantly affects the rice cultivation decision, but we find no 
evidence that risk aversion decreases rice adoption. To examine the heterogeneous 
effect of risk preference on rice cultivation, we estimate the model with an interaction 
term between risk preference and irrigation access. The coefficients of the interaction 
terms are not significant (see S6 Table). 
Do risk preferences affect the adoption of better cultivation practices and 
increased productivity among rice growers? To answer this question, we adopt the same 
model as above but with different dependent variables. We use dummy variables 
indicating whether a household constructed bunds, broadcasted seeds, and transplanted 
in rows, if it applied chemical fertilizer, and the magnitude of the rice harvest and 
income per hectare.  
Table 6 indicates the estimation results by limiting the sample to rice growers. 
Column 1 shows that those who have higher risk aversion tend to adopt better 
cultivation practices (e.g., constructing bunds). Those who have higher loss aversion 
tend to adopt transplanting in row method (Column 3). There is, however, no evidence 
that risk preferences affect the adoption of chemical fertilizer and broadcasting method. 
Rather, rice cultivation experience increases adoption of such cultivation practices. As 
shown in columns 5 and 6, we find no evidence that risk preferences affect rice 
productivity. A strong inverse relationship is observed between plot size and rice 
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productivity. In the previous tables, we find that those who have higher loss aversion are 
less likely to grow rice on average.  
 
Table 6. Adoption of Rice Cultivation Practices and Rice Productivity  
 
 Bunds Broadcast Transplant 
in row 
Chemical 
fertilizer use
Yield (ton) 
per hectare 
Rice 
income 
(million 
shilling) 
per hectare
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Risk aversion 0.122* -0.123 0.0567 0.0137 -0.0299 -0.0192 
 (0.0671) (0.155) (0.0959) (0.0106) (0.0435) (0.0574) 
Loss aversion 0.0191 -0.106 0.218** 0.00837 0.0613 0.0275 
 (0.0651) (0.158) (0.0983) (0.0106) (0.0466) (0.0615) 
Area under rice (ha) 0.359* 0.0148 0.367 -0.00476 -0.459*** -0.352* 
 (0.201) (0.260) (0.308) (0.0336) (0.147) (0.193) 
Rice experience (yrs) 0.0489*** -0.148*** 0.0408** 0.00586*** 0.0133 0.0143 
 (0.0127) (0.0343) (0.0176) (0.00183) (0.00846) (0.0111) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LC1 fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 460 460 460 460 460 460 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Numbers shown are marginal effects. ***, **, and 
* indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. Attrition weights are used. Other controls are 
household head’s age, education, female headed household, household size, share of male adult 
members, share of female adult members, land owned, value of assets, non-labor income, off-farm 
employment, not owning mobile phone. Column 1-4 are estimated by correlated random effect 
probit model while column 5 and 6 are by correlated random effect tobit model. Sample: rice 
growers in 2009 and 2016. 
 
To further explore how risk preferences affect land use (crop choice), we 
examine the share of upland cultivated area and the size of the land allocated to crops 
other than rice. As shown in Table 7, risk preferences do not affect the cultivation of 
maize and legume crops (e.g., beans, ground nuts). However, root crops (e.g., cassava, 
sweet potatoes) are positively associated with loss aversion. Higher loss aversion 
increases the size of the land allocated to root crops. Since root crops are less prone to 
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drought and constitute a main food crop in Uganda, this result suggests that those who 
are more loss averse tend to be subsistence farmers.  
 
Table 7: Crop choice other than rice (share of area allocated to other crops) 
 Share of cultivated upland area Area (ha) 
 maize roots legume maize roots legume 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Risk aversion -0.00144 0.00341 0.00702 -0.00685 0.00413 0.00768 
 (0.00492) (0.00519) (0.00397) (0.0117) (0.00960) (0.00915) 
Loss aversion 0.00166 0.00505 -0.00264 -0.00526 0.0174* -0.00256 
 (0.00475) (0.00495) (0.00379) (0.0113) (0.00915) (0.00872) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LC1 Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean in 2009 (s.d.) 0.222 
(0.186) 
0.293 
(0.230) 
0.166 
(0.144) 
0.460 
(0.738) 
0.487 
(0.692) 
0.345 
(0.580) 
Mean in 2016 (s.d.) 0.299 
(0.294) 
0.244 
(0.281) 
0.178 
(0.217) 
0.465 
(0.635) 
0.326 
(0.442) 
0.295 
(0.510) 
Observations 1006 1006 1006 1005 1005 1005 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Estimated by correlated random effect tobit model. 
Numbers shown are marginal effects. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10%, 
respectively. Means of all time varying factors (except risk and loss aversion and Muslim dummy) 
are controlled for. Attrition weights are used. Other controls are household head’s age, education, 
female headed household, household size, share of male adult members, share of female adult 
members, land owned, value of assets, non-labor income, off-farm employment, not owning mobile 
phone. 
  
Finally, we assess how households make diversification decisions not only for 
crop production but also for other income sources. As explained earlier, we divide 
income into four sources: agriculture (income from crop production and farm labor 
wages), livestock, non-farm activities, and non-labor income. We estimate the same 
model to test if risk preferences affect income diversification or not. As shown in Table 
8, no evidence is found that risk preferences increase the share of a specific income 
source.  
 
Table 8: Share of Income by Source 
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 Agriculture Livestock Non-farm Non-labor 
income 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Risk aversion -0.00401 0.00494 0.0203 -0.000897 
 (0.00584) (0.00631) (0.0135) (0.00312) 
Loss aversion -0.00670 -0.00303 0.0178 -0.00167 
 (0.00559) (0.00603) (0.0125) (0.00297) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LC1 fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean in 2009 (s.d.) 0.706 (0.260) 0.155 (0.276) 0.119 (0.244) 0.020 (0.142)
Mean in 2016 (s.d.) 0.625 (0.291) 0.148 (0.187) 0.228 (0.299) 0.000 (0.001)
Observations 1006 1006 1006 1006 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Estimated by correlated random effect tobit model. 
Numbers shown are marginal effects. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10%, 
respectively. Means of all time varying factors (except risk and loss aversion and Muslim dummy) 
are controlled for. Attrition weights are used. Other controls are household head’s age, education, 
female headed household, household size, share of male adult members, share of female adult 
members, land owned, value of assets, non-labor income, off-farm employment, not owning mobile 
phone. 
 
4. Conclusions 
This study examined whether risk-taking decisions are explained by risk 
preferences elicited by lab-in-the-field experiments in rural Uganda conducted in 2017, 
when many households were affected by severe drought. Under rainfed conditions in 
which agricultural production is subject to high risk, households’ risk attitudes are 
expected to influence crop choices because each crop is associated with a different risk 
level. In our sample communities, lowland rice cultivation is a profitable cash crop but 
has a higher risk of negative income during drought than other cash crops have because 
it requires households to hire labor to ensure timely harvesting and planting. It is thus 
hypothesized that the higher paid-out costs required for rice cultivation with an 
increased risk of zero harvest during drought conditions can prevent households 
characterized by higher risk and loss aversion from growing rice.   
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Using panel data collected in 2010 and 2017, we estimated the effect of risk 
preferences on crop and input choices via a correlated random effects model to consider 
unobserved time-invariant individual heterogeneity such as farming ability. Our results 
show that households with higher loss aversion are less likely to grow rice or expand 
rice cultivation. Among rice growers, however, risk preferences do not affect the 
decision on whether to adopt better cultivation practices or enhance rice productivity as 
measured by yield and income, respectively. Since households can reduce risk through 
diversification, we also examine whether households displaying higher risk and loss 
aversion allocate more land to crops with lower risks of negative income and engage in 
activities other than crop production. Our results show that households displaying 
higher loss aversion tend to allocate more land to roots crops, but we found no evidence 
of income diversification.   
Given that higher loss aversion deters the expansion of rice cultivation, 
fostering such an expansion requires interventions designed to reduce risk and losses 
such as crop insurance, investments in irrigation facilities, and the development and 
diffusion of drought-tolerant rice varieties.   
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Supporting information 
S1 File. Additional Details on Experiments 
Although this study focuses on risk preference, we conducted 2 risk experiments and 2 
time experiments as well as dictator and trust game experiments in one session. We 
randomly assigned LC1s to sessions beginning with risk experiment and time 
experiments. Dictator and trust game experiments were conducted after risk and time 
experiments.  Before beginning the experiments, it was emphasized to the subjects that 
one of the risk and time experiments and one of the dictator and trust game experiments 
were to be played ex post for actual stakes; consequently, based on their respective 
choices in the actual experiments, their monetary payoff would be determined by the 
outcome of that lottery. This incentive was in addition to a show-up fee of Ushs 5,000, 
which was intended to cover the opportunity cost of participating in the experiments and 
to encourage participation. Ushs 5,000 is approximately 2 days’ worth of wages for a 
typical male farm laborer by following Cardenas and Carpenter (2008)’ argument that 
payment of 1 to 2 days’ wages for a half-day session to subjects participating in 
economic experiments induces salience among them. 
For the risk and time experiments, subjects were requested to choose column A 
or column B. All experiments were conducted with all participating subjects duly 
present to avoid any cross-talk effects that could bias the experimental outcome. Given 
that the level of education attainment of the subjects was low (5.9 years of schooling), 
we made a strong assumption that the subjects would not adequately understand the 
concept of probabilities used in the experimental design. Subjects who had trouble 
filling out the answer sheets individually during the experiments were carefully helped 
by the enumerators, who cautiously avoided giving specific instructions to the subjects 
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on how to answer. However, such subjects were almost negligible. Whereas the 
enumerators were conversant in the local dialect, they had no formal connections with 
the respective communities, which minimized any bias in responses to the subjects. In 
addition, while extensive training was offered to the enumerators to fully acquaint them 
with the research design and experimental procedures, they were ignorant about the 
experimental hypothesis. 
After completing the risk and time experiments, one game was randomly 
selected to be played for real cash using a bingo machine. Each subject rolled the bingo 
machine with one of four balls numbered 1, 2, 3, and 4 for selecting one experimental 
result for actual payment. Balls 1, 2, 3, and 4 represent risk preference experiment 1, 
risk preference experiment 2, time preference experiment 1, and time preference 
experiment 2, respectively. Once the experiment to be played for real cash was decided 
based on the first ball to come out of the bingo machine, subjects were again asked to 
roll the bingo machine with eight balls numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 to decide 
which row was to be played for real cash.  
 
Measuring Risk Preferences 
Risk Aversion 
 According to Holt and Laury (2002), the relative risk aversion parameter is often 
estimated to represent the degree of risk aversion. When a constant relative risk aversion 
utility function,  𝑢ሺ𝑀ሻ  ൌ ெభషಚଵିఙ   is assumed, where σ indicates the curvature of the 
utility function, and M is income. To compute the risk aversion parameter, σ, risk 
experiments are designed in such a way that they take the form of pair-wise choices or 
choices from a series of lotteries that include payoffs in each state i, 𝑀𝑖, with its 
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probabilities 𝑝𝑖 (Holt and Laury 2002). To compute the degree of risk aversion σ 
reliably, we equate two lotteries that give the same level of expected utility 
∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖ൌ1 𝑀𝑖
1െσ
1െ𝜎    to the individual and solve them simultaneously.  
For risk preference experiment 1, which involved gains only, subjects were 
asked to choose between column A, which offered a sure payoff of Ushs 4,000 with 
100% certainty, or column B, which offered two different payoffs with probabilities of 
either an extra 25% of payoffs in column 1 or 75% of payoffs in column 2. To ensure 
that subjects fully understood the notion of probabilities, four balls were used to 
demonstrate the probability concept. Figures A1 and A2 represent an excerpt of the risk 
preference experiments in which subjects made their respective payoff choices. The 
balls were numbered 1, 2, 3, and 4; they can be seen circled below A and B in each of 
the excerpts. Risk preference experiment 1 was elicited to measure the subject’s degree 
of risk aversion, risk neutrality, or risk seeking, based on the point at which the subject 
switches from option A to B. For example, if a subject chose option A in rows 1-1, 1-2, 
1-3, and 1-4, and chose option B in row 1-5, the subject’s risk preference can be 
represented mathematically as follows: 
40001െσ
1െ𝜎  ൒ 0.25 ൈ 13000
1െσ
1െ𝜎 ൅  0.75 ൈ 2000
1െσ
1െ𝜎    …………… (1) from row 1-4 
40001െσ
1െ𝜎  ൑ 0.25 ൈ 16000
1െσ
1െ𝜎 ൅  0.75 ൈ 2000
1െσ
1െ𝜎    …………… (2) from row 1-5 
Solving for equations (1) and (2) simultaneously, the interval of the risk aversion 
parameter is 0.41 ൏  σ ൑ 0.62 , and taking the mid-point, we obtain the risk 
aversion parameter as σ = 0.52. 
In terms of real payment to the subjects after the experiments, for the sake of 
illustration, suppose that risk preference experiment 1, which involved gains only, was 
chosen to be played for real cash, implying that out of the four balls that were placed in 
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the bingo machine, ball 1 came out of the bingo machine first. Then, when eight balls 
were inserted in the bingo machine to determine which row would be played for real, 
and ball 5 came out, row 1-5 would be played for real. Subjects who had chosen option 
A in row 1-5 would be paid Ushs 4,000 with 100% certainty. For subjects who had 
chosen option B, four balls would be inserted in the bingo machine, and they would roll 
it again. If ball 1 came out first, the subjects would earn Ushs 16,000, while if balls 2, 3, 
or 4 came out first, the subjects would earn Ushs 2,000. Table 1 (Panel A) shows the 
payoff matrix for risk preference experiment 1. Subjects who chose A throughout are 
considered very risk averse, and therefore, are assigned σ ൌ 3.04. Subjects who chose 
all B are considered very risk seeking and therefore, are assigned σ ൌ  െ1.15.  
 
Loss Aversion 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in their seminal paper developed an alternative model 
from the expected utility theory, known as prospect theory. They argued that people 
knowingly underweight outcomes that are merely probable compared to outcomes that 
are certain. The loss aversion concept originates from this alternative model of prospect 
theory. The loss aversion concept has been described as the tendency of the prospect of 
losses to loom much larger than the prospects of gains of the same magnitude. This can 
be represented as u(M) < -u(-M). In economics experiments, just like risk aversion, loss 
aversion is elicited using lottery games. However, this involves negative payoffs as part 
of the choices (see Figure A2). The risk aversion parameter σ of each subject elicited in 
experiment 1 is utilized to estimate the level of loss aversion. Taking into consideration 
the mean estimated value of σ for each subject and the value function 
 uሺMሻ ൌ െλ ሺିெሻభషಚଵିఙ  for losses (M < 0) and uሺMሻ ൌ
ெభషಚ
ଵିఙ  for gains (M > 0), the range 
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of the loss aversion parameter λ for each switching point is estimated by equating the 
expected utilities in columns A and B. 
Risk preference experiment 2 was undertaken to measure the subjects’ degree of 
loss aversion. The experiment involved gains and losses. Subjects were asked to choose 
between columns A and B; both columns were sub-divided into two, with each column 
representing a payoff and probability of 50% chance of winning or losing. For the 
sub-divided columns, column 1 involved gains while column 2 involved losses. When 
risk preference experiment 2 was chosen to be played for real cash, this scenario 
implied that out of the four balls inserted in the bingo machine to determine which game 
was to be played for real cash, ball 2 came out first. Then, when eight balls were 
inserted to determine which row would be played for real, and ball 2, for example, came 
out first, row 2-2 would be played for real cash. For subjects who had chosen option A 
in game 2, if either ball 1 or 2 came out of the bingo machine first, the subjects would 
receive Ushs 4,000, while if the first balls out were either balls 3 or 4, the subjects 
would lose Ushs 500. However, for subjects who had chosen option B, if either ball 1 or 
2 came out of the bingo machine first, they would receive Ushs 6,000, while if the first 
balls out were either balls 3 or 4, the subjects would make a loss of Ushs 4,000. Given 
that all subjects were to receive a participation fee of Ushs 5,000, in the event of a loss 
by the subject, the money would be deducted from this fee. The experimental design 
was structured in such a way that even if a subject suffered a loss in risk game 2, he/she 
would still earn an amount from his/her participation fee. The minimum amount a 
subject would earn, in the event that he/she made the largest loss in risk preference 
experiment 2 is Ushs 1,000 (Ushs 5,000–4,000).  
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Figure A1: Risk Preference Experiment 1 Answer Sheet 
 
 
 
        
 A B  Do you prefer 
A or B?  ① ②③④   ①  ②③④   
1–1 4,000  4,000 2,000   
1–2 4,000  7,000 2,000   
1–3 4,000  10,000 2,000   
1–4 4,000  13,000 2,000   
1–5 4,000  16,000 2,000   
1–6 4,000  16,000 3,000   
1–7 4,000  16,000 3,500   
1–8 4,000  16,000 4,000   
  
RISK GAME 1
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Figure A2: Risk Preference Experiment 2 Answer Sheet 
 
  
 
 A B  Do you prefer 
A or B?  ① ②  ② ④  ①②  ③ ④   
2–1 6,000 -500  6,000 -4,000   
2–2 4,000 -500  6,000 -4,000   
2–3 1,000 -500  6,000 -4,000   
2–4 500 -500  6,000 -4,000   
2–5 500 -500  6,000 -3,000   
2–6 500 -1,000  6,000 -3,000   
2–7 500 -1,000  6,000 -2,000   
2–8 500 -1,000  6,000 -1,000   
RISK GAME2
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S1 Table. Attrition (Probit model)  
 Characteristics in 2009 
=1 if 
households 
were attrited 
Years of experience on rice cultivation -0.002* 
[0.001] 
Age of household head 0.000 
 [0.001] 
Education of household head 0.008 
[0.010] 
Education of household head (squared) -0.001 
[0.001] 
Number of household members -0.006 
[0.004] 
Share of male adults aged 15-64 -0.012 
[0.100] 
Share of female adults aged 15-64 -0.123 
[0.095] 
Land owned (ha) -0.008 
[0.007] 
Share of lowland owned 0.050 
[0.039] 
Member of local group -0.063*** 
[0.020] 
Owned bull -0.009 
[0.025] 
LC1 FE Yes 
Observations 599 
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at LC1, 
marginal effects are shown 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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S2 Table. Correlates of Risk Preferences  
 Risk Aversion Loss Aversion 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Rice experience (years) -0.009   -0.006   
 (0.009)   (0.008)   
Never grown rice   0.108   0.156  
  (dummy)  (0.176)   (0.179)  
Married 0.0336 0.0570 0.0535 -0.397* -0.366* -0.407* 
 (0.166) (0.164) (0.165) (0.212) (0.214) (0.213) 
Age 0.0014 0.0008 0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0020 -0.0028 
 (0.0051) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0053)
Head -0.197 -0.169 -0.171 0.203 0.217 0.186 
 (0.184) (0.188) (0.185) (0.209) (0.210) (0.213) 
Male -0.0464 -0.0766 -0.0785 -0.136 -0.147 -0.126 
 (0.194) (0.197) (0.199) (0.218) (0.222) (0.220) 
Schooling 0.0198 0.0213 0.0228 -0.0174 -0.0160 -0.0190 
 (0.0219) (0.0223) (0.0228) (0.0229) (0.0230) (0.0234)
Household size -0.00924 -0.0108 -0.0120 0.0172 0.0176 0.0134 
 (0.0153) (0.0152) (0.0156) (0.0166) (0.0165) (0.0160)
Share of males (15-69) 0.212 0.258 0.241 0.219 0.228 0.169 
 (0.360) (0.362) (0.359) (0.375) (0.363) (0.373) 
Share of females (15-69) 0.356 0.312 0.326 0.501 0.456 0.452 
 (0.437) (0.439) (0.448) (0.463) (0.459) (0.477) 
Landholding in acre (log) -0.0109 -0.0119 -0.0109 -0.0498 -0.0507 -0.0493 
 (0.0327) (0.0322) (0.0333) (0.0414) (0.0414) (0.0407)
Value of assets (log) 0.0231 0.0241 0.0226 0.0169 0.0177 0.0143 
 (0.0519) (0.0516) (0.0517) (0.0451) (0.0443) (0.0454)
Drought   -0.0413   0.106 
   (0.167)   (0.140) 
Floods   -0.178   0.533 
   (0.589)   (0.411) 
LC1 fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,040 1,041 1,041 1,004 1,005 1,005 
R-Squared 0.194 0.193 0.192 0.170 0.170 0.172 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at LC1. Estimated by OLS. ***, **, and 
* indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. Attrition weights are used. 
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S3 Table. Determinants of Rice Cultivation (Cross section data)  
 Rice grown in 2009 Rice grown in 2016 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Risk aversion -0.020 -0.023 0.003 0.002 
 (-1.068) (-1.216) (0.172) (0.097) 
Loss aversion -0.043** -0.044** -0.034* -0.036* 
 (-2.411) (-2.469) (-1.815) (-1.916) 
Head Age -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.003 -0.003 
 (-4.107) (-4.034) (-1.473) (-1.488) 
Head Schooling -0.018** -0.016* -0.001 -0.001 
 (-2.087) (-1.909) (-0.141) (-0.076) 
Female Head -0.121 -0.121 -0.078 -0.076 
 (-1.263) (-1.271) (-0.709) (-0.705) 
Household Size (log) 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.020* 0.022* 
 (2.932) (2.895) (1.704) (1.925) 
Share of males (15-69) 0.241 0.237 0.103 0.115 
 (1.214) (1.203) (0.597) (0.668) 
Share of females  0.066 0.066 0.002 0.031 
 (15-69) (0.317) (0.316) (0.007) (0.142) 
Landholding in acre  -0.015 -0.012 0.068* 0.070** 
 (log) (-0.938) (-0.744) (1.921) (1.966) 
Value of assets (log) 0.040** 0.038** 0.023 0.022 
 (2.069) (1.988) (0.768) (0.737) 
Non labor income 0.070 0.080 0.001 0.027 
 (1.316) (1.546) (0.010) (0.338) 
Off farm employment -0.032 -0.032 0.011 0.022 
 (-0.527) (-0.522) (0.166) (0.339) 
No mobile phone -0.039 -0.039 0.092 0.094 
 (-0.673) (-0.679) (0.958) (0.979) 
Farmer group member 0.109*  0.065  
 (1.688)  (0.938)  
Saving group member -0.008  0.057  
(ROSCA or VSLA) (-0.077)  (0.861)  
LC1 fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 503 503 503 503 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at LC1. Estimated by Probit model. 
Marginal effects are shown.. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
Attrition weights are used. 
 
  
39 
 
S4 Table. Disadoption of Rice in 2016 and Adoption in 2016 
 Grew rice in both 2009 
& 2016 =1 
(conditional on grew rice 
in 2009) 
Probit model, dy/dx 
Grew rice only in 
2016=1   
(conditional on not grew 
rice in 2009) 
Probit model, dy/dx 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Risk aversion 0.010 0.008 0.027 0.036 
 (0.498) (0.406) (0.862) (1.119) 
Loss aversion -0.039* -0.042** 0.009 0.003 
 (-1.950) (-2.069) (0.324) (0.092) 
Head Age -0.004* -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 
 (-1.678) (-1.585) (-0.514) (-0.401) 
Head Schooling -0.008 -0.006 0.002 -0.001 
 (-0.839) (-0.635) (0.170) (-0.072) 
Female Head 0.020 0.026 -0.140 -0.178 
 (0.169) (0.221) (-0.997) (-1.308) 
Household Size (log) 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 
 (0.062) (0.011) (0.101) (0.009) 
Share of males (15-69) 0.434* 0.421* 0.091 0.201 
 (1.824) (1.777) (0.310) (0.674) 
Share of females (15-69) 0.373 0.388 -0.074 -0.129 
 (1.390) (1.440) (-0.256) (-0.415) 
Landholding in acre (log) -0.020 -0.014 -0.044 -0.050* 
 (-1.092) (-0.799) (-1.625) (-1.756) 
Value of assets (log) 0.052*** 0.048*** 0.002 -0.007 
 (3.612) (3.305) (0.076) (-0.331) 
Non labor income 0.040 0.060 0.069 0.085 
 (0.695) (0.987) (0.809) (0.956) 
Off farm employment 0.029 0.034 -0.011 0.048 
 (0.448) (0.510) (-0.112) (0.476) 
No mobile phone -0.065 -0.073 -0.112 -0.140 
 (-1.140) (-1.265) (-1.164) (-1.423) 
Farmer group member  -0.086  0.007 
  (-1.175)  (0.060) 
Saving group member  -0.111  0.423*** 
(ROSCA or VSLA)  (-0.883)  (3.111) 
LC1 fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mean (s.d.) 0.702 (0.458) 0.345 (0.477) 
Observations 362 362 173 173 
Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. Numbers shown are marginal effects. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. Attrition weights are used. 
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S5 Table. Rice Cultivation by wealth category  
 Rice grown in last 12 
months 
Probit model (dy/dx) 
Share of area under rice 
in last 12 months 
Tobit model (dy/dx) 
Area under rice (ha) 
in last 12 months 
Tobit model (dy/dx) 
 Poorer Richer Poorer Richer Poorer Richer 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Risk aversion 0.0456 -0.0999 -0.00635 -0.00531 -0.0144 -0.0218 
 (0.0543) (0.0795) (0.00766) (0.00848) (0.0130) (0.0208) 
Loss aversion -0.173*** -0.0742 -0.0218*** -0.00990 -0.0433*** -0.0551***
 (0.0563) (0.0704) (0.00769) (0.00771) (0.0131) (0.0189) 
Head Age -0.0111* -0.0166* -0.00159* 0.000673 -0.00250* -0.00186 
 (0.00589) (0.00856) (0.000855) (0.000954) (0.00145) (0.00235)
Head Schooling 0.00874 -0.0746** -0.00108 -0.00930*** 0.00378 -0.0109 
 (0.0266) (0.0296) (0.00388) (0.00313) (0.00659) (0.00780)
Female Head 0.361 0.0814 0.0719 -0.0310 0.0706 -0.206 
 (0.434) (0.636) (0.0660) (0.0762) (0.112) (0.192) 
Household Size (log) 0.0923** -0.0321 0.00602 -0.00722 0.0320*** 0.0174 
 (0.0421) (0.0413) (0.00625) (0.00460) (0.0106) (0.0116) 
Share of males  0.924 -0.458 0.132 -0.197** 0.148 -0.129 
(15-69) (0.635) (0.818) (0.0989) (0.0960) (0.168) (0.242) 
Share of females  1.033 -1.871* -0.136 -0.174 0.0162 -0.131 
 (15-69) (0.762) (1.014) (0.118) (0.118) (0.200) (0.297) 
Landholding in acre 0.0765 0.165 -0.0223* -0.0239** 0.0541*** 0.0251 
 (log) (0.0750) (0.106) (0.0117) (0.0112) (0.0198) (0.0282) 
Value of assets (log) 0.0665 0.0570 0.00489 0.00577 0.000659 0.0460 
 (0.0737) (0.114) (0.0116) (0.0134) (0.0197) (0.0337) 
Non labor income -0.161 0.0664 -0.0412 0.00676 -0.0985* 0.0368 
 (0.213) (0.237) (0.0338) (0.0278) (0.0575) (0.0700) 
Off farm  0.0659 -0.176 0.0400 -0.00998 0.00334 0.0686 
employment (0.239) (0.241) (0.0376) (0.0281) (0.0639) (0.0706) 
No mobile phone 0.202 0.0338 -0.0239 0.00306 -0.0232 -0.0153 
 (0.260) (0.249) (0.0395) (0.0290) (0.0671) (0.0730) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LC1 fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 496 509 496 509 496 509 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at LC1. Marginal effects are shown.. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. Attrition weights are used. 
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S6 Table. Area under rice (ha) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Risk aversion -0.00580  -0.0194  
 (0.0180)  (0.0272)  
Loss aversion  -0.0691***  -0.0590** 
  (0.0172)  (0.0251) 
Risk aversion x Share of HH with   0.0161  
 irrigation in 2009 (LC1)   (0.0716)  
Loss aversion x Share of HH with    -0.0303 
 irrigation in 2009 (LC1)    (0.0654) 
Share of HH with    3.019*** 2.947*** 
irrigation in 2009 (LC1)   (0.465) (0.507) 
Head Age -0.00551*** -0.00642*** -0.00565*** -0.00609*** 
 (0.00208) (0.00205) (0.00203) (0.00201) 
Head Schooling -0.00283 -0.00497 0.000322 -0.00292 
 (0.00790) (0.00787) (0.00772) (0.00772) 
Female Head -0.0211 -0.0254 -0.00626 -0.0136 
 (0.157) (0.155) (0.157) (0.156) 
Household Size (log) 0.0323*** 0.0311*** 0.0329*** 0.0315*** 
 (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0116) (0.0115) 
Share of males (15-69) 0.155 0.132 0.146 0.123 
 (0.214) (0.213) (0.214) (0.213) 
Share of females  -0.143 -0.141 -0.171 -0.165 
 (15-69) (0.263) (0.262) (0.264) (0.263) 
Landholding in acre  0.0636*** 0.0675*** 0.0637*** 0.0672*** 
 (log) (0.0239) (0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0241) 
Value of assets (log) 0.0361 0.0443 0.0376 0.0463* 
 (0.0273) (0.0273) (0.0277) (0.0276) 
Non labor income -0.0214 -0.0484 -0.0223 -0.0501 
 (0.0673) (0.0679) (0.0676) (0.0682) 
Off farm employment 0.0276 0.0320 0.0270 0.0310 
 (0.0708) (0.0708) (0.0711) (0.0711) 
No mobile phone 0.0406 0.0303 0.0451 0.0333 
 (0.0711) (0.0711) (0.0714) (0.0714) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LC1 fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1006 1006 1006 1006 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at LC1. Estimated by correlated random 
effect tobit model and the average marginal effects are shown. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
1, 5, and 10%, respectively. Attrition weights are used. 
